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The World Economy 
emergence of strong protectionist lobbies 
in the US manufacturing and agricultural 
sectors, a development which has prompted 
widespread concern in both developing and 
developed countries . With world trade 
growing more s lowly, p r o t e c t i o n i s t 
sentiment was reinforced during the f irs t 
half of 1985 by renewed criticisms in both 
the EEC and North America of Japanese 
restraints on imports. The Japanese lack 
of effective commitment to an open trading 
system continued to invi te the threat of 
retaliation. 
Tension of a different nature and with a 
potentially much different outcome for the 
world economy i s prevalent among the 
members of OPEC. Faced w i t h 
overproduct ion, f a l l i n g prices and a 
decision to break ranks on i t s adherence 
to OPEC pricing policy by non-member 
Mexico, OPEC was riven with disagreement 
on production levels and prices during the 
f i r s t s ix months of the year . The 
likelihood is that, despite greater recent 
cohesion among OPEC members, prices will 
continue to f a l l and that may st imulate 
activity in both developed and developing 
countries. 
The recovery in the world economy which 
began in 1982 now appears to be moving out 
of i t s fastest growth phase. With the US 
economy growing more slowly in the f i r s t 
half of 1985 than in the corresponding 
per iod of 1984, the previous marked 
differences in growth rates between the US 
and the European economies are being 
eroded. Indeed, a number of European 
countries look set to achieve faster 
growth during 1984 than the US. Largely 
due to slower US growth, world trade i s 
likely to expand this year by around 5J-6S 
as compared to 9% l a s t year. The Bonn 
economic summit in May and subsequent 
policy statements provide no indicat ions 
that the slackening momentum in the world 
economy i s to be compensated for by 
reflation elsewhere. 
During the fas ter phase of US growth the 
strength of the dol lar led to the re -
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The deceleration of US output growth 
apparent in the second ha l f of 1984 
continued in the f i rs t six months of 1985. 
During the f i r s t three months of 1985 
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output grew at an annual r a t e of only 
0.3%. Some recovery took place during 
the second quarter , although, as in the 
f i r s t q u a r t e r , output growth f e l l 
considerably below an i n i t i a l "flash" 
e s t i m a t e . Second quarter output i s 
estimated to have grown at a rea l annual 
rate of 1.7%. Thus, over the past four 
quarters US output has grown by only 2%, a 
much lower ra te than in the immediately 
preceding year. Although fas ter output 
growth is forecast for the second half of 
1985, the annual ra te i s l ike ly to f a l l 
far short of the o f f ic ia l forecast of 4% 
on which the January Budget proposals were 
based. 
Slower US output growth reduced aggregate 
indust r ia l growth in the OECD countries 
from an annual ra te of 4.6% in the l a s t 
quarter of 1984 to an annual ra te of 3.3% 
in the f i rs t quarter of 1985. Moreover, 
for the f i r s t time in the recent past i t 
caused growth in North America 2.2% to 
fa l l below the growth ra tes for OECD 
Europe and t h e EEC 2.8% and 2.9% 
respectively). 
In contrast to weak US output performance, 
particularly in the manufacturing sector, 
domestic demand has continued to expand at 
a ra te of around 4% and, following the 
pattern of the past two years, has been 
l a rge ly s a t i s f i e d through impor t s . 
Although the dol lar f e l l from i t s peak 
January l e v e l s , the f i r s t q u a r t e r ' s 
def ic i t on merchandise trade was $33bn. 
This follows a deficit of $123bn for 1984. 
The importance of US demand in generating 
export-led growth in other major OECD 
countries i s evident in the recent annual 
report from the Bank for Internat ional 
Settlements (BIS). Net foreign demand's 
contribution to GNP growth is estimated at 
42% for Japan, 55% for France and 17% for 
West Germany. With growing uncertainties 
about US growth prospects and renewed, 
related concern over the sustainability of 
the US budget and c u r r e n t account 
deficits, however, the dollar has weakened 
against other currencies since January. 
Such d e p r e c i a t i o n and p r e s s u r e s for 
g r ea t e r p ro t ec t i on i sm wi th in the US 
diminish the prospects for a continuing 
world recovery. In July Paul Volcker, 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, 
again encouraged other industrial nations 
to foster more rapid domestic expansion. 
There i s , however, l i t t l e l ikelihood of 
European countries pursuing expansionary 
policies. European governments continue 
to focus on the control of inf la t ion as 
the primary objective of policy and to 
exhibit no incl inat ion to providing a 
d i rec t f iscal stimulus. Reduction in 
government expenditure continues to occupy 
a central instrumental role. 
Following the devaluation of the l i r a 
within the European Monetary System in 
July and the accompanying programme of 
public expenditure reductions, the Italian 
Government has indicated that further 
spending cuts are to be announced in 
September. These measures are intended 
to reduce the I t a l i an budget de f i c i t to 
13.5% of GDP. In France i t was fel t that 
the current austerity programme would be 
r e l a x e d in t h e approach t o t h e 
parliamentary elections next March. That 
now appears u n l i k e l y . Concern over 
slippage from both f iscal and monetary 
ta rge ts has prompted further plans for 
reductions in real public expenditure of 
up to 2.0%. Much pressure, both external 
and domestic, has been exerted on the West 
German Government to provide a f i sca l 
stimulus. There also, however, the 
Government is reluctant to reflate despite 
a growing t r a d e su rp lus , Government 
borrowing of only 1.5% of GNP, declining 
real investment and s luggish p r i v a t e 
consumption demand. Some l i m i t e d 
s t imulus has been provided for the 
construction sector in an attempt to 
promote employment but that i s within the 
constraint of an unchanged t i gh t , f i sca l 
stance. 
The major country possibly moving to 
policies likely to promote trade is Japan. 
With the exceptions of spending on defence 
and foreign aid, Japan s t i l l r e ta ins a 
firm commitment to fiscal austerity with 
public expenditure planned to be reduced 
for the third successive year. The 
Japanese Government has responded, 
however, to increasing cr i t ic i sm of i t s 
import controls and regulations and to the 
threat of re ta l i a to ry measures by the US 
and the EEC by announcing an "import 
action programme" designed to improve 
market access for her trading partners . 
In addition, with an election likely next 
year, proposals are under discussion for 
expansion of domestic demand. This 
expansion i s to be achieved through 
measures such as tax reform, a t t rac t ing 
p r i v a t e c a p i t a l in to publ ic sec to r 
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projects and deregulation. The immediate 
effects of these measures on import demand 
are unlikely to be significant. However, 
if effectively implemented, this shift in 
Japanese policy stance wi l l help offset 
increasing trade friction. 
LABOUR MARKETS 
prevent a further increase in unemployment 
of around half a mill ion people. This 
largely reflects the structural change in 
European labour markets discussed in 
previous Commentaries. As a consequence 
of differences in growth rates and in unit 
labour costs among European countries, 
Belgium, France and Ireland are likely to 
experience the most substantial increases 
in unemployment. 
After f a l l i n g s l i g h t l y during 1984, 
unemployment in the OECD area rose in the 
f i r s t quarter of 1985. The increase in 
the standardised unemployment ra te from 
8.1% in the l a s t quarter of 1984 to 8.5$ 
in the f i r s t three months of t h i s year 
r e s u l t e d from widesp read h i g h e r 
unemployment. Despite the sharp 
deceleration of US growth, the increase in 
unemployment from 7.1$ to 7.2$ was no 
g r e a t e r than elsewhere in terms of 
percentage points . In OECD Europe and 
the EEC unemployment rose from ra tes of 
10.9$ and 10.7$ to 11.1$ and 10.9$ 
respectively. 
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Within Europe higher f i rs t quarter levels 
of unemployment were recorded for the UK, 
Italy and France while in West Germany the 
downward trend in unemployment during 1984 
was a r r e s t e d . Of the major OECD 
c o u n t r i e s only Japan experienced a 
reduct ion in unemployment, the r a t e 
falling from 2.7$ to 2.5$. 
The prospect in the near future i s of 
further rises in unemployment. Average 
unemployment in the major OECD countries 
i s l ike ly to increase towards 8.5$ by the 
end of next year. Higher levels of 
unemployment wi l l be concentrated in 
Western Europe. Despite continuing 
output growth, European economies are 
unlikely to generate suff icient jobs to 
INFLATION 
Over t he p a s t 5 y e a r s s u c c e s s i v e 
recoveries in the world economy have 
typical ly generated successively higher 
l e v e l s of i n f l a t i o n . The cur ren t 
recovery depa r t s from t h i s p a t t e r n . 
Despi te the a c c e l e r a t i o n of growth, 
particularly in the f i rs t half of 1984 as 
a consequence of the ex t r ao rd ina ry 
expansion of the US economy, the inflation 
ra te of 4.5$ in 1984 for the OECD area 
remained very similar to that for 1983 and 
there are no signs of any marked increase 
during 1985. 
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The average annual ra te of inf la t ion for 
the OECD area currently stands at 4.7$. As 
in the recent past, this average embraces 
lower inf la t ion ra tes in North America 
than in Europe. The annual ra te for 
North America stands at 2.5$ while the 
rates for OECD Europe and the EEC are 7.6$ 
and 6.4$. Moreover, there continue to be 
considerable differences in inf la t ion 
ra tes among European countries. These 
range from 2.5$ for West Germany and the 
Netherlands through 6.5$ for France and 
6.9$ for the United Kingdom to 17.7$ for 
Greece and 22.3$ for Portugal. 
A number of factors have contributed to 
the moderation of inflationary pressures. 
In the United States the strength of the 
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d o l l a r has reduced import c o s t s and 
through the associated import penetration 
has in tensi f ied domestic competition. 
World market commodity and oil prices have 
also remained depressed. Within Europe 
the thrust of macroeconomic policies has 
been d i r e c t e d p r i m a r i l y a t reducing 
inf la t ion ra tes . In addit ion, recovery 
has been phased different ly in North 
America and Europe. Rapid demand growth 
in the US has been sa t i s f ied in large 
measure by imports from countries with 
spare capac i ty , thus avoiding the 
inflat ionary implicat ions of world-wide 
supply constraints. 
Continuing relatively low inflation rates 
are expected u n t i l the end of 1986. 
Commodity and oil markets are anticipated 
to remain weak and, as mentioned above, 
European po l icy cont inues to focus 
primarily on control of in f la t ion . In 
add i t i on , d e p r e c i a t i o n of the dol lar 
aga ins t o t h e r major c u r r e n c i e s w i l l 
moderate i n f l a t i o n a r y p re s su re s in 
European countr ies . In the US there 
appears to be some scope to meet the 
effects of a weaker dol lar , unless the 
rate of depreciation picks up, by reducing 
profi t margins on imports rather than by 
raising import prices. 
PROGNOSIS 
Recent events have h igh l i gh t ed the 
considerable changes that have taken place 
in the world economy over the past ten 
years . In the mid-1970's the rapid 
increases in OPEC oil prices precipitated 
widespread contraction. Now, however, 
with the strength of the OPEC car te l 
greatly diminished, oil prices are subject 
to cont inuing downward p r e s su re and 
concerns over the continuation of the 
current recovery in the world economy 
centre on developments in the US. 
Lower o i l pr ices and depreciation of the 
dollar since February to the levels of a 
year ago have made an exogenous 
contribution to the pursuit of lower rates 
of inf la t ion in Europe and Japan. Some 
downward movement in i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
interest rates has also been possible as a 
consequence of the r educ t i ons in US 
interest rates over the past six months. 
Lower interest rates reflect the easing of 
US monetary policy. In mid-July the 
Federal Reserve Bank widened the t a rge t 
range for i t s p r i n c i p a l monetary 
aggregate. The objectives underlying 
th i s relaxation of monetary policy are: 
to provide some stimulus to the slowing US 
economy; and to induce further dol lar 
depreciation. This l a t t e r objective 
r e f l e c t s major concern over import 
pene t r a t i on and the resurgence of 
protec t ionis t lobbies. The Chairman of 
the Federal Reserve Bank has indicated, 
however, that further monetary relaxation 
to reduce in te res t ra tes wi l l not be 
attempted and that measures must be taken 
by Congress to reduce the budget deficit. 
The prospects for substantial reductions 
in the budget d e f i c i t remain highly 
u n c e r t a i n . This u n c e r t a i n t y i s 
compounded by the Admin i s t r a t i ons ' 
continuing adherence to growth ta rge ts 
higher than the growth anticipated by most 
commentators. Unless growth rebounds 
sharply in the second half of the year to 
an annual ra te of 5%, the basis of the 
Administration's mid-year budget review is 
very optimistic. The borrowing necessary 
to finance the budget deficit will almost 
cer ta inly cause in te res t ra tes to r i s e . 
Over the pas t two years net c a p i t a l 
inflows have strengthened the dol lar . 
If, however, the US government f a i l s to 
tackle the budget de f ic i t , confidence in 
the dollar is now more likely to weaken. 
A weaker dollar will intensify the problem 
of slowing growth in world trade and, in 
conjunction with upward p re s su re on 
in te res t r a t e s , wi l l depress economic 
activity. Particularly affected will be 
those countries which have over the recent 
pas t enjoyed the bene f i t s of t r ade 
expansion. As argued in the l a s t 
Commentary, a combination of export 
contraction and higher interest rates will 
exacerbate the debt problems of many 
developing countries. 
The longer the reduction in the US budget 
de f ic i t i s postponed, the more damaging 
wi l l be the effects both in the US and 
elsewhere. The s i gn i f i c ance of the 
domestic and international implications of 
fa i lure to reduce the budget de f i c i t 
appear to be fully appreciated in the US. 
At present, however, Congress seems no 
nearer to achieving effective reductions 
than earlier in the summer. 
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